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Abstract
With today’s system-on-chip (SOC) technology, we are able to design larger and 
more complicated application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and field 
programmable gate array (FPGA) in shorter time period. The key point of the 
success of SOC technology is the reuse of intellectual property (IP) cores. 
Consequently the copyright protection for these IP cores becomes the major concern 
for the development pace of SOC technology.
Watermarking technology has been proved to be an effective way of copyright 
protection. In this thesis, the author presents two new watermarking algorithms 
respectively at algorithm level and FPGA layout level. The simulations and 
implementation results show that the new proposals have much less design and 
hardware implementation overheads, lower watermark embedding and extraction 
cost, as well as higher security strength, compared to the previously proposed 
methods.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Research Motivations
In the past decade there has been an explosion in the use and distribution of digital 
contents such as music, movies, electronic books, software, etc, over Internet. Electronic 
commerce applications and online services have also grown rapidly. But at the same time, 
digital products and services providers concern themselves about the unrestricted 
duplication and dissemination o f copyrighted materials [1][2]. For example, the lack of 
effective protection methods for copyright content was the main reason for the delayed 
introduction of Digital Video Disks (DVDs) [1], Two complementary technologies have 
been developed as countermeasures against copyright violation, one is encryption and the 
other is watermarking [1].
More recently, watermarking has been shown as an effective way to protect intellectual 
property (IP) o f hardware design. In the past few years, the system-on-chip (SOC) 
technology has made it possible and efficient to design complicated DSP ASICs and 
FPGAs. The main reason o f the success o f the SOC technology is the reuse of IP cells. 
The copyright protection for the IP cells becomes a vital issue for further development of 
the SOC technology. Encryption technology can provide copyright protection during the 
transmission of the IP cells from the vendor to the customer. It is obvious that encryption 
is not enough for the complete IP protection since there is no protection for the IP cells at 
the customer's end after the customer receives and decrypts the encrypted IP cells. 
Watermarking technology has been used to complement encryption by embedding a piece 
o f secret information into the original data to generate the watermarked data. It is 
assumed that the watermarked data still keep their proper content or function and this 
secret information cannot be removed from the watermarked data without damaging the 
proper content/function of the data.
1
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Several watermarking schemes for DSP algorithms and/or their ASIC/FPGA designs have 
been presented since late 1990's [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][[10][11]. However, many o f the 
watermarking schemes have been shown not secure by recent proposals of attacking 
schemes [8] and not efficient due to large overheads and performance degradation
[3][[9][10][11]. Many IP vendors do not use any watermarking scheme and are still trying 
to find an efficient enough watermarking scheme to be used for the customer's end. 
Market leaders o f ASIC CAD tool and IP providers like Cadence and Synopsys have built 
up research teams focusing on ASIC IP's watermarking technology
[4][12][13][14][15][16],
Two pieces o f research work have been proposed in this thesis. Firstly, we apply the 
method o f modifying the least significant bit (LSB) to FIR filter and some other DSP 
algorithms. The simulation results show that the watermarked filter/DSP algorithms have 
very low magnitude distortion. Secondly, a novel watermarking scheme at FPGA layout 
layer is proposed. It provides IP protection for FPGA design by utilizing the location 
information o f the used FPGA cells. Compared to the previous methods for FPGA, the 
proposed watermarking scheme has extremely low overheads and high security strength.
1.2. The Organization of Thesis
There are five chapters in this thesis. In Chapter 1, the motivation of developing new DSP 
algorithms' FPGA watermarking scheme is given. Chapter 2 introduces watermarking 
technology, watermarking application fields and requirements, current ASIC/FPGA as 
well as DSP algorithms' watermarking technologies. Chapter 3 presents the filter 
coefficients' LSB watermarking scheme. Chapter 4 proposes the FPGA cell locations' 
watermarking scheme. Several FPGA IPs, like FIR filter, comb filter, Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) match filter, discrete cosine transform (DCT) IPs are used to 
verify the performance o f watermarking scheme. The comparisons between the FPGA 
cell location modification watermarking scheme and the current available DSP algorithms 
as well as ASIC/FPGA watermarking schemes are also given in chapter 4. Conclusions 
are drawn in chapter 5 based on the simulation and analysis presented in the previous 
chapters. Several possible future work directions are also mentioned.
2
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Chapter2: 
Review of Watermarking Technology
In this chapter, we introduce the concepts o f watermarking and information hiding 
technologies. Then the application fields and general requirements for watermarking 
technology are discussed. Finally, a review o f the current ASIC/FPGA as well as DSP 
algorithms' watermarking schemes is given. A few watermarking attack methods are also 
introduced.
2.1.Watermarking Technology Basics
2.1.1. Current Copyright Protection Technologies
Great effort has been made for copyright protection in the past years. We have seen some 
legislation act like Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was effective on October 
28,1998, in U.S.A [1]. The European Union is also preparing similar intellectual property 
rights protection for digital multimedia products [1]. To provide copyright protection for 
digital data, two complemented methods have been developed: encryption and 
watermarking.
Encryption technology can be used to protect digital data during the transmission from 
the sender to the receiver. After the receiver has obtained the encrypted data and 
decrypted it, the decrypted data is no longer protected. Unauthorized copies may be made 
from the decrypted data. For example, after downloading the music files from the Internet, 
the customer can use the given key to decrypt the music files and make copies by himself, 
and then gives them to his friends. The encryption technology cannot protect the 
copyright anymore [1],
Watermarking techniques can be used to complement encryption by embedding secret 
information, which is imperceptible to the receiver, called watermark, into the original
3
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data. Watermark is a piece o f information embedded within other objects that shows the 
identity o f copyright owner. Watermarks tell us who is the owner of the IP for the object 
[1][2]. Watermarking is an old technology that has been used for centuries. This 
technology was firstly developed to protect valuable paper documentations, like bank 
notes, commercial contracts as well as cash. In this thesis, the discussion o f watermarking 
technology will be limited to the digital watermarking field. For example, if  a customer 
violates copyright protection by making illegal copies o f a watermarked image and freely 
distributing them among his friends, then the original copyright owner can suit this 
customer and show the copyright information embedded in the image as the watermark in 
the court [1][2].
2.1.2. Watermarking as a Sub-field of Information Hiding
Figure 1 Classification of Information Hiding Technology [2]
■ Information Hiding
Information hiding includes covert channels, steganography, anonymity and copyright 
marking, see Figure 1. Covert Channels means the hidden secret channels used by two 
parties for communication. Anonymity is the technology that investigates the hiding of 
information sender's true name. Steganography means hiding information in other 
information. This is the technology to conceal the existence o f information within other 
data [2]. Steganography is different from Cryptography. Cryptography is the technology
Covert | 
Channels Steganography Anonymity Copyright marking
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to protect the content o f messages. People use encryption algorithms to encrypt data and 
use decryption algorithms to decrypt the encrypted data [2].
We can see there are two subsets under copyright marking, one is robust copyright 
marking and the other is fragile watermarking. Robust copyright watermark is the 
watermark that is infeasible to be removed or modified without destroying the object at 
the same time [2].
Fragile watermark is the watermark that will be destroyed as soon as the object is 
modified too much [2]. We can see that the watermarking technology belongs to robust 
copyright marking. Watermarking is the technology or procedure to embed a digital 
watermark into a digital IP and detect/extract it from the digital IP that has been 
watermarked [2].
Fingerprinting technology also belongs to robust copyright marking. Fingerprint is the 
serial number information hidden in the original data. Fingerprinting is the technology or 
procedure to embed fingerprint into the original digital IP and detect/extract it from the 
digital IP that has been fingerprinted [2]. Fingerprints can enable the intellectual property 
owners to identify which customer broke his license agreement and supplied the property 
to unauthorized third parties [2].
This thesis focuses on the imperceptible watermarking method since imperceptible 
watermark will arouse less suspicion and attacks. Until recently, information hiding 
technology received much less attention from the research community and industry than 
cryptography (encryption belongs to cryptography). But this condition has changed. The 
first academic conference on the watermarking subject was organized in 1996 [2]. The 
main driving strength is concern over copyright protection. Law enforcement and counter 
intelligence agencies are also very interested in understanding these technologies so as to 
detect and trace hidden copyright and serial number information [2]. In this area rapid 
strides are being made constantly but general theories are still very tentative.
Copyright marking, as opposed to Steganography, has some additional requirement o f 
robustness against possible attacks. Copyright marks can be either visible or invisible,
5
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depending on the specific application case. But most of the literature has focused on 
invisible (or transparent) digital watermarks that have wider applications [2], 
Watermarking in paper is a very old anti-counterfeiting technology; more recent 
innovations include special ultraviolet (UV) fluorescent inks used in printing traveler's 
cheques. In this paper, the discussion will focus on digital watermarking techniques.
2.1.3.Watermarking Application Fields
The watermarking technology can be used for the following purposes:
Copyright Protection: The owner can embed a watermark with copyright information in 
the original data. Under the condition that there is any copyright argument or copyright 
violation, the original owner can show the copyright information within the watermark to 
the judge at court [1][2].
Fingerprinting'. The copyright owner or IP vender also can embed different watermarks 
called fingerprints in the copies submitted to different customers. So they can trace the 
source o f illegal copies [1][3][5]. For example, the music publisher can embed different 
serial number to the CDs that will be sold by different retail agents in different countries. 
If the music publisher finds some illegal copies of the CD products, the publisher can 
trace the source of the illegal copy by extracting the watermark.
Copy Protection: The watermark information can stop the copy procedure during 
unauthorized copy. For example, for some software, there are copy protection codes 
embedded. When the customer try to make illegal copies, these copy protection bits will 
make the computer to stop execute the copy instructions [1],
Authentication: Fragile watermarks (watermarks that will be modified or removed 
without difficulty with the modification o f the original data) can be used to check the 
authenticity o f the data. The author o f the electronic books can embed large amount- of 
fragile watermarks into the whole electronic book. So if some of the watermarks have 
been removed, that means some sections o f the books have been alternated [ 1 ].
2.1.4.Watermarking Embedding and Extraction Schemes
The watermarking procedure is to add watermark that contains copyright information into 
the original data by using watermark embedding algorithms. The embedded data are the
6
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message that one wishes to send secretly. Sometimes secret or public keys are also used 
to encrypt the original copyright information. The key is used to control the hiding 
processing so as to restrict detection and/or recovery of the embedded data to parties who 
know it [2]. After applying the watermarking algorithm we will have the marked data 
with watermark inside.






Figure 3 Watermark Extraction Scheme [2]





In Figure 3, the watermark inside the IP will be extracted. Let us use the digital photo 
image as an example. The watermark extraction procedure is to use the watermark and 
the original image, as well as the image that will be tested. After comparing the original 
image and the image under test, we can find the watermark inside the tested image, which 
is the copyright confidence. Other watermark extraction methods are similar to this 
scheme.
2.1.5.General Watermarking Requirements
A few general requirements for a watermarking scheme have been proposed [1][2][3][4]:
7
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Perceptual Transparency: A watermark is imperceptible if  humans cannot distinguish the 
original data and the data with watermark. Since by comparing the original data and the 
watermarked data, people can easily find the difference, that is the watermark, we should 
assume that the customer does not have access to the original data [1].
Payload o f  the Watermark: This is the amount o f the information that can be stored in a 
watermark. For specific data object, if  we can embed more information into the original 
data, we say this watermark-embedding scheme has higher payload. A good watermark- 
embedding scheme should provide high payload [1].
Robustness: This refers to the difficulty to remove/modify the watermark without 
degrading or changing the original data. To remove the watermark, the potential attacker 
should firstly try to find the watermark. If the watermark is very hard to find, very hard to 
forgery and very hard to remove, we say that this kind o f watermarking scheme has good 
robustness [1][2][3]. To remove or modify the watermark must require the knowledge of 
a secret, like the secret key value, the watermarking procedure and watermarking 
algorithm details. The watermark should survive all attacks that do not degrade the IP's 
perceived quality. Some attacks include re-sampling, re-quantization, dithering, 
compression and the combination of them.
Security: The security o f  watermarking scheme means the watermarking scheme's ability 
against watermark detection/forgery/modification. We should assume that the method to 
encrypt and watermark the data is known to the public and the security must lie in the 
choice of a key [1].
Independency: If  multiple marks are inserted in a single object, then they should not 
interfere each other.
Most watermarking applications have a sharp tradeoff between robustness and watermark 
embedding efficiency. This make a single watermarking scheme meeting the 
requirements o f all applications to be difficult [2]. At the other side, most real case 
applications do not require all of the properties for general watermarking schemes.
2.2.ASIC and FPGA Watermarking Technology
2.2.1. Where We Need to Add Watermark
8
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Figure 4 SOC Design Flow and Different Forms of IP Blocks [17]
SOC Design Flow and Different Forms of IP Blocks
System Level Design(Co-design Level)
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A watermark can be added at different levels such as algorithm level, architecture level, 
register level, layout level, etc. At a lower level, payload is usually higher. A watermark 
can be added at multiple levels to make an attack even harder.
Figure 4 shows the current SOC design flow and different types o f IP blocks that need to 
be protected. For each level, there should be different copyright protection schemes. For 
watermarking technology, the watermarking schemes o f these IPs locating at different 
levels are also different. The watermark embedded at the higher level will be carried to 
the lower levels. For example, if  we add watermark to the RTL model (soft IP), the 
watermark will be carried to the lower levels, like gate level and layout level. This is the 
reason we prefer to add watermark to the design level as high as possible. The reason is if  
any attacker wants to remove the watermark and get the high level design, he needs to 
remove the watermark embedded at each lower level, if  the attacker can only access the 
lowest level o f IPs.
9
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The watermark embedded at higher level is often easy to be identified and removed, if  the 
IP is provided with high-level form modules. Human beings normally will feel much 
easier to understand high-level design data. For example, the attacker will feel more 
comfortable to understand the structure of the software program written in C or Java, 
comparing to the layout data o f all binary format (FPGA bit-stream programming data or 
ASIC layout data).
2.2.2. The Importance of ASIC/FPGA IP Watermarking
The fast development o f system-on-chip technology increases the importance o f IP reuse. 
Now we can integrate the complete system on a single silicon chip that has all the 
functions of those chips on a printed board produced several years ago. Reusable virtual 
components or IP blocks are most effective for the purpose of reducing design cycle time, 
as well as decreasing design risk. IP owners want to make sure that their IP products will 
not be illegally redistributed. Consumers also want to make sure that the IPs they buy are 
legitimate. FPGAs become good candidates for fast-to-market products like DSP cores 
for wireless communication and computer network applications. Distribution o f the IP 
cores through the Internet is the commercial fact but it also increases the risk of IPs being 
stolen and forgery [17]. The IP provider can use some technologies like JAVA applets 
and JHDL to protect their IPs during the evaluation o f the IPs by potential customers. 
Based on the JHDL design tool, these JAVA applets allow structure viewing, circuit 
simulation and netlist generation for some cases. Applets can be customized to provide 
varying levels o f visibility and functionality [18].
Watermark technology is also needed for AISC/FPGA co-design and co-verification, 
which means from the right beginning there should be considerations for the integration 
o f different types o f design blocks (including software codes, digital blocks, analog 
blocks, as well as IPs with the form of Very-high-speed Integrated Circuit Hardware 
Description Language (VHDL)/Verilog source code, black box schematic block or layout 
hard blocks) [17][19]. There should be copyright protection schemes for all these kinds o f 
design IPs.
10
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IP vendors can protect their copyright by encrypting their source codes (VHDL/Verilog) 
when these codes are sent to the buyers. These modules can be loaded into authorized 
simulators or synthesis tools without making the source code visible to the system 
designer who uses the IP blocks. In this case, the CAD tool maintains the safety o f the 
copyright. But in practice, this protection is often broken with attacking the CAD tool 
(simulators, synthesis tool) directly. We need to find extra methods to protect the design 
IPs. Watermarking technology has shown its ability for ASIC/FPGA IP protection.
The methods o f watermarking for digital images, music and video are quite different from 
the methods to protect DSP algorithms and ASIC/FPGA designs. The research about the 
DSP algorithm and ASIC/FPGA watermarking just began several years ago and still is a 
relatively new area. But we can see this area begin attract more researchers and some 
market leader ASIC/FPGA design software companies like Cadence that also begins to 
support such kind o f research activities.
2.2.3. ASIC/FPGA Watermarking Evaluation Criteria
Watermarking is a process that hides or embeds data into a design IP that can help deter 
theft and counterfeiting. The watermark serves as evidence o f ownership. A complete 
ASIC/FPGA IP protection scheme based on watermarking consists of two phases: 
watermark synthesis and watermark detection [4] [12].
The synthesis phase is fully characterized by [4]:
(a) Algorithms translating design features onto a unique watermark
(b) Tr: the worst case time required to forge and/delete the watermark
(c) Pu: the odds that a design carries an unintended watermark in part or in its totality. -
The detection phase is characterized by [4]:
(d) Pm: the probability o f a detection miss
(e) Pf=Pu: the probability o f a false alarm.
Typical specification o f a complete IP protection scheme could be [4]:
11
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Tr > = 2  years,
Pu=Pf <= IE-30
Pm <= IE-6
To evaluate certain ASIC/FPGA and DSP algorithms' watermarking scheme, some major 
factors need to be considered. The following factors have combined the requirements 
presented in [4][12] as well as the general requirements for watermarking schemes [1][2]. 
These evaluation criteria will be used in the following chapters.
Embedding Efficiency: This item shows the watermarking schemes' efficiency. For 
example for the same filter, watermarking scheme A can embed maximum 8-bit 
information and watermarking scheme B can embed 16-bit information, we say 
watermarking scheme B has better embedding efficiency.
Embedding Cost'. This item reflects the effect o f the watermarking procedure on the 
original ASIC/FPGA or DSP algorithm. If the watermarking scheme introduces 
comparatively small timing delay increase, hardware cost increase, algorithm complexity 
and/or software computational time's increase, we say this scheme has low embedding 
cost.
Design Overhead'. This item shows the extra time for the design with watermarking steps. 
If the watermarking steps will add small extra design time, we say this watermarking 
scheme has low design overhead.
Extraction Cost: This one is related to the difficulty, complicity, as well as the time of 
watermark extraction. If the extraction procedure needs less effort, for example, does not 
need complicate test equipments, people having strong electronics background or extra 
software, we will say this scheme's watermark extraction cost is low.
Extraction Miss Probability. This is the probability that a watermark cannot be extracted. 
This item equals to Pm.
Probability o f  Coincidence: This item shows the probability that one watermarked IP will 
carry the whole or partial watermark as another IP that has not been watermarked. The 
smaller this number, the better. Normally this number should be less than IE-30 for 
copyright protection applications. This item equals to Pu and Pf.
12
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Security Strength: This item shows the watermarking scheme's ability against potential 
attacker's attempt o f detecting, counterfeiting and remove o f the watermark. The higher 
the ability, the better the security strength. Also the more transparent the watermark, the 
better the security strength. The value o f Tr is one of the indications o f this specification. 
Applied Area: This item is related to the application fields o f the watermarking scheme. 
Some watermark schemes can be used for ASICs' IP protection, others are for FPGAs 
only. Some are for digital designs and others are for analog designs. The wider the 
applied area, the better the watermarking schemes.
2.3. Filter Watermarking Schemes
The following three filter watermarking schemes have been proposed: filter magnitude 
modification, filter tap’s equal-replacement and windowing function watermarking. In 
this section, the watermarking procedures and the major properties o f these three schemes 
are mentioned.
2.3.1. Filter Magnitude Modification [9]:
Firstly, the designer separates the filter stop or pass-band to several equal width zones 
(i.e., seven zones). Then he modifies the filter magnitude response according to the 
watermark bits. If the bit is 1, he will decrease the filter magnitude response by x dB 
(here x is a small number like 0.1). If the bit is 0, he will increase the filter magnitude 
response by x dB. After that, he uses the modified filter magnitude response as the design 
constrains input to the design tool. Finally he obtains the filter coefficients. Now the 
filter's magnitude response decided by the new coefficients will contain the watermark 
information that is 7-bit as 0110101.
Figure 5 The Magnitude Response of the Filter with 7-bit Watermark [9]:
13
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Watermarking performance analysis for filter magnitude modification scheme:
The embedding efficiency is less than 8 bit/31taps—0.258 bit/tap. The authors do not give 
out clear number of the maxim number o f watermark bits, which can be hidden into the 
filter's magnitude response. But the authors do mention that for the hiding o f 7-bit 
watermark, the 31-tap filter is not long enough in terms of filter tap number. The filter 
with 41-taps can be used to embed such 7-bit watermarks. Since the authors divide the 
filter's pass band's magnitude response and modify the magnitude response, the filter's 
order may increase. But the authors o f [9] do not mention other simulation results with 
more watermarking bits, the author o f this thesis can not exactly evaluate the relation 
between the watermark length and the filter's order, as well as the hardware cost increase. 
There is 7% hardware increase for the embedding of 7-bit watermark at algorithm level 
only.
From [9], the designer needs to re-design the filter for embedding the watermark. So the 
design overhead is high. The authors o f this paper do not mention the watermark 
extraction flow. It seems that we can plot out the filter's magnitude response and check 
the magnitude response, then find the watermark bits related to the magnitude ripples. 
And if the original filter already has magnitude ripples in pass-band, it will be more 
difficult to extract the watermark from its magnitude response.
The authors o f paper [9] do not provide any information about the possible attack mode 
analysis and security strength analysis. The filter performance degradation is related to 
the filter magnitude change value. If the filter magnitude change decreases, the filter 
performance degradation will decrease, but the filter taps number will increase. This 
scheme adds watermark at algorithm level, the highest level for filter design, so it is hard 
to be removed from lower level of filter’s implementation, like logic, layout or circuit 
level. This watermarking scheme increases the complexity o f filter design. It also 
increases the order o f the filer, since we introduce new ripple constrains to the filter 
magnitude response, As a result, the hardware cost increases by +7%.
14
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2.3.2. Filter Tap’s Equal Function Replacement Method [9]
The designer firstly designs the filter with the original performance specification then he 
replaces the filter taps by using equal filter structure replacement. There are three equal 
function filter structures, A, B and C. When the watermarking bit is 0, the designer will 
use B to implement this tap. When the watermarking bit is 1, the designer will use C to 
implement this tap. When there is no watermark to be embedded, the designer will keep 
on using A.









J ,y  a/Qi
Watermarking performance analysis:
Since the author can use one tap to embed one bit of watermark information, the 
embedding efficiency is 1 bit/tap. After watermarking, the hardware area increases by 
29%, which is primarily due to a higher internal word length. The higher word length is 
the result o f dividing coefficients introduced by equal filter tap function replacements. 
The increase o f hardware area will also increase the power consumption o f the filter, 
since we increase the amount o f operations introduced by dividing operations. The design 
o f the filter with watermark needs to replace the standard filter taps with equal functional 
tap module. This introduces the non-regularity for the filter's hardware design and will 
increase the time and effort o f VHDL coding.
The authors o f the paper do not mention the details of how to extract the watermark. The 
extraction o f the watermark needs the extractor to review the filter's implementation 
layout or logic circuit design or VHDL/Verilog source code, extract the logic functions of
15
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the filter and extract the watermark according to the equal function replacement 
watermarking rules. This will require considerable time and effort. The probability of 
coincidence o f this kind will be zero if only the author o f that paper uses this 
watermarking method. Since the tap structure o f the filters will be all the same if the filter 
is designed in traditional way.
The authors do not mention the security strength o f this method. Layout reverse 
engineering may be able to remove this kind o f watermark, as long as the layout 
processing technology is visible by the attacker (normally 0.5um or wider metal wire 
width). This method can be applied to both ASIC and FPGA design. There is no filter 
response performance degradation, since the authors use equal functional module to do 
the replacement.
This scheme makes watermarking at algorithm level, so it is hard to remove at the lower 
levels and there is no degradation o f filter response performance. But this method 
increases hardware cost dramatically by +29. It also makes the filter structure to be not 
uniform and increases the design time for implementation on ASIC or FPGA.
2.3.3. Windowing Function Watermarking [10] [11]
Suppose W(n) is the original windowing function, where 1<= n <=N.
Firstly the designer adds random noise to W(n) to obtain Wm(n):
Wm(n)=W(n)+a * r(n), 1 <=n<=N. Here a is a small number like 0.0001.Then the designer 
adds watermarking bits c (n) to Wm (n):
_W m  (n), 1<= n <= i-1
Wc (n) = Wm (n)+b*c(n-i+l), i<=n<=i+P-l
Wm (n), i+P<= n <=N/2
—W c(N+l-n), N /2+l<= n <=N.
The designer will let b=0.0001. The starting bit o f the P-bit watermark code sequence 
c (n-i+1) is bit i o f Wm (n). The sequence Wc (n), n=l,N , is the new window function 
which contains the watermark information.
Watermarking Performance Analysis:
16
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For a classical windowing function with length n, we can embed n bits o f watermark 
information, so the embedding efficiency is 1 bit/tap. Since the embedding cost is just to 
add random noise sequence as well as watermark bits to the original windowing function, 
the embedding procedure is simple and fast at software computational level. The 
embedding cost is low. There is no design overhead for this method. Since the watermark 
is added to the windowing function after it has been designed.
The authors do not mention the details o f watermark extraction flow. But we can see that 
the watermark can be extracted by comparing (subtraction operation) the watermarked 
windowing function with the original windowing function. Then by subtracting the 
random noise sequence, we can extract the watermark. To do this is simple and fast at 
software level. The extraction cost is low. The length of the watermark decides the 
probability of coincidence. For the watermark with length n, it equals to l/(2An).
The authors do not provide detail information about the application fields. But if  this 
method is only carried at algorithm level, the attacker may be able to add extra random 
noise to the windowing function and remove the watermark. So the security strength is 
low. Since this method is developed specifically for windowing function, it can be 
applied to windowing function or similar structure functions. The authors do not mention 
this method can be applied to other DSP algorithms' ASIC/FPGA implementation or not.
There will be some degree o f performance degradation, which is caused by the 
modification o f the windowing function. The degradation is decided by the comparative 
ratio of the windowing function's modification value and the original function value. This 
method embeds watermark at algorithm level that is hard to remove at a lower levels. -Its 
watermarking scheme is simple and direct. But this method increases design complexity 
and the security strength is low.
17
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2.4. FPGA Watermarking Schemes
In this section, two kinds o f FPGA watermarking schemes are described. The first one 
uses FPGA spare LUTs to embed watermarking information and the second one is to 
manipulate the FPGA bit-stream programming data directly.
2.4.1.FPGA Fingerprinting by Using Spare LUTs (look-up-table)
This method for watermarking FPGA uses the unused lookup table (LUT) bits to encode 
the signature bits. In order to further hide the signature, the constrained configurable logic 
blocks (CLBs) are incorporated into the design with unused interconnections and 
neighboring CLB inputs. Each unused LUT bit can be used to encode one bit o f the mark. 
The inputs o f the marked CLB are taken from the passing signals in adjacent routing 
channels and outputs are routed to neighboring don’t care inputs. Upon inspection, it is 
not apparent which CLB has been marked [5][6][20][21],
Watermarking Performance Analysis:
From the embedding method, every LUT (look-up-table) can be used to embed 16 bits o f 
watermark [21], so the embedding efficiency is 16 bit/LUT. When the FPGA device has 
two LUTs in one FPGA slice, the embedding efficiency equals to 32 bit/slice. The 
embedding cost for this method is not too large. For embedding 7 bits o f watermark, the 
hardware usage increase is less than 1%. [5] The author does not mention the timing 
delay change before and after watermarking.
To use this method, the designer needs to assign the locations of the unused LUTs, then 
place and route the original design around these watermarked unused LUTs. The authors 
o f [5] provide the extraction procedure information. The watermark extractor needs to 
find the locations of the watermarked LUTs and read out the contents o f these LUTs. The 
length o f the watermark decides the probability of coincidence. If the length o f the 
embedded watermark is m, the probability o f coincidence is l/(2Am).
The authors o f paper[5] do not give out the analysis of possible attack methods and the 
security strength of this method. Another paper [8] points out that one attack method
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could be used to successfully detect the watermark embedded in this way. Since this 
watermarking method uses unused LUTs to embed the watermark, there will be no logic 
change connections between these LUTs and the original logic design. So the attacker 
may be able to scan the logic changes happening inside the FPGA and separate the 
unused LUTs whose output has no effected on the logic changes o f other parts. Since 
there is available attach scheme to break this kind of watermarking, new FPGA 
watermarking method need to be developed.
2.4.2. FPGA Programming Bit-stream Data Watermarking [3]
This FPGA watermarking method involves substituting watermark bits for some of the 
bits in the configuration bit stream that control multiplexers for the unused CLB outputs. 
This method involves the modification o f the FPGA bit stream programming data. But in 
practice, this kind o f knowledge is not open to the FPGA design engineers. So the 
application area o f this scheme is limited.
2.5. ASIC Watermarking Schemes
In this section, several ASIC watermarking methods are mentioned. Compared with 
FPGA watermarking technology, there are more papers about ASIC watermarking 
methods. ASIC watermarking methods at different design stages like logic synthesis, gate 
level and layout level have been proposed.
2.5.1. Finger-marking by Transistor Finger W/L (width/length) Watermarking
In paper [3], the author presents a method called finger marking. It can be applied for 
integrated circuit design at the physical (layout) design level. The watermark is embedded 
in the transistor layout, making this method applicable to digital, analog and mixed-signal 
SOC (system-on-chip) designs [3]. The transistors in the circuit design are uniquely 
ordered based on their connectivity. The random bit-stream is then embedded into the 
transistor geometries to serve as an indelible mark in the circuit. If the value of the bit­
stream bit is 0, the designer then uses even number o f transistor fingers. For example: for 
a N-transistor with design specification of W/L=300um/5um, he uses 2 parallel
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150um/5um fingers. If the value of the bit-stream bit is 1, the designer uses odd number 
o f transistor fingers. For example, for a N-transistor with design specification of 
W/L=300um/5um, he uses 3 parallel 100um/5um fingers.
This method can be applied to analog circuit design and easy to be understood by the 
designer. But this watermarking scheme increases the design effort to implement the 
layout. It is easy to be removed by layout reverse engineering. The reason is that for 
analogy design, the layout processing technology is much bigger than pure digital designs. 
It makes it easier for the attacker to observe the layout by optical devices( micorscope, for 
example). We can extract the circuit diagram from the layout then re-arrange the finger 
configurations to remove the watermarking information. But this kind of reverse 
engineering need at nearly the same time to re-design the layout. So this method still has 
its value.
2.5.2, Hierarchical Watermarking
Charbon [13][14][15] presents a hierarchical watermarking technique for ASIC designs.
It involves the unique mapping o f design topological information onto a sequence of 
symbols called a topological signature. His method has limited applicability in designs 
that use more than just standard cells and lacks robustness analysis[4][12]. Charbon and 
Torunoglu also present the watermarking technology o f sequential functions [22]. This 
method will impose a digital watermark on the state transition graph of the synchronous 
circuits [22][23].
2.5.3. Protocols for IP Protection
Protocols for IP protection have also been developed for hiding data at the combinational 
logic's behavioral synthesis level [16]. This approach involves embedding a watermark as 
a set o f design constrains. The synthesis tool results in solution satisfying both the 
original design specifications and the additional set o f constrains. Constraint-based 
techniques have been proposed for watermarking at different stages of the VLSI (very 
large scale integration) design process. This method can be used well for pure-digital 
layouts, but need to be complemented with another scheme when applied for SOC (for
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example, digital-analog-mixed-signal) design. Watermarking protocols added at ASIC 
layout place and route stage has also been developed [7].
2.6. Attack Methods Targeting IP Protection Routines 
with Watermarking
Several attack methods have been mentioned by different authors [8][17].
An attack method called logic redundancy detection uses logic scan method to scans the 
logic transitions happening inside the ASIC or FPGA and try to find the redundancy in 
the design. Then the attacker may be able to locate and remove the redundant logics and 
the watermark that is implemented by using these redundant logics [8]. Another attack 
method is finite state machine reduction. This method is trying to reduce the unused 
transitions in the state machine transitions that have been used to embed watermark [17].
The hardware remove method will physically remove the FPGA and ASIC chip that 
contains watermark. No existing watermarking scheme can avoid this kind o f attack. But 
this method also makes the attacker away from the usage o f the IP. So the copyright 
protection purpose also has been realized [17].
Other attack methods include encryption system attacks. This one is the attack o f the DES 
and AES cryptographic algorithms. This method is a big challenge o f the security of 
many watermarking schemes. The designer needs to keep an eye on the most advanced 
technology o f encryption. And the attack for ASIC logic synthesis level watermarking 
tries to extract the logic synthesis constrains that contain watermark information. ASIC 
layout level reverse engineering is to recover the original circuit design by photographing 
the layout, then carry human or computer vision detection for layout to logic extraction.
2.7. Importance of Developing New Watermarking 
Schemes for DSP Algorithms’ FPGA Implementation
The author selects the DSP algorithm's FPGA implementation's watermarking as the topic
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of the thesis. The reason is the DSP algorithm's FPGA implementations are widely used 
for the consumer electronics as well as telecommunication applications. And the 
protection o f this kind of IPs is important. To show the importance o f the FPGA 
watermarking technology, two real scenarios are used to show its application for FPGA 
based IPs' fingerprinting and watermarking.
Scenario One: Who Have Sold the FPGA Chips to Our Enemy? 
Figure 7 Who Have Sold the FPGAs to Our Enemy?
AeentMl f Agent .‘‘2







In this scenario, FPGA IP producer X in country A produces FPGA chips and develops 
high performance DSP IP soft cores. This company also sells FGPAs with DSP IP cores 
implemented inside. Company X sells their products through 99 retail agents. The 
customer officers o f country A find some mail packages that contained company X's 
FPGA products. These mail packages are mailed to the electronics retail agent M in 
country B. But the names and addresses o f the sender are false. FBI officers do not find 
any valuable human being's fingerprints o f the sender, except those fingerprints o f the 
post officers'. So the question here is: How the FBI officer can identify which sales agent 
has involved into the illegal export of the FPGAs? Is there any technology that can make 
this task much easier?
FPGA watermarking technology is one o f the good candidates that can be used to 
fingerprint the FPGAs. For this kind of applications, the watermark is used as fingerprints
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to identify different objects. For our example, there are 99 retail agents and we need at 
lest 99 different fingerprints to identify all the sales agents. So we need 8-bit watermark 
length, since 2's power 8 is 128. The idea is each sales agent will receive different 
watermarks that have been embedded into the FPGAs containing DSP IP cores. Although 
the functions of these FPGAs are the exactly the same, the watermark is different. And all 
the watermarks have been documented by company X. In this way, the FBI officer will 
feel easy to trace the source of the illegal exported FPGAs, by contacting company X and 
extracting the watermark inside the FPGAs. In chapter 4, the author's implementation 
results o f such kind o f 8-bit watermark into some real world DSP IPs are presented. The 
simulations are used to verify the effect of watermark embedding. The simulation results 
are encouraging.
Scenario Two: Is Mr. Z the DSP IP Thief?
Mr. Z is the technician who works for company X that produces FPGAs and DSP IP 
cores. Mr. Z's job is to program the FPGA chips with the programming data that is stored 
in the PC. Mr. Z has ability to read and copy the data. Some sales persons o f company X 
report that another company, company Y, also sales the similar products. So the managers 
o f company X want to know weather Mr. Z has sold the FPGA programming data to 
company Y. If it is true, how can company X suite Mr. Z, as well as company Y in the 
court? What kind o f evidence will help company X to win the case? Insiders make many 
high-tech IP stealing cases; the law procedures for these cases are normally long and 
complicated, partly due to the high-tech background. This makes the suite process time 
and money consuming.
So is there any technology that will simplify the situation and help to protect the right- of 
the original IP copyright owner? As mentioned in chapter one, watermarking technology 
can also be used for copyright information embedding. The watermark length o f this kind 
o f application will sometime be longer than the watermark's length for fingerprinting 
usages. For this case, we need 128-bit watermark, to provide strong enough witness for 
copyright provident. In chapter 4, the simulation results of embedding this kind of 128-bit 
watermark are presented.
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From the review o f the current available DSP algorithms' and FPGA implementation 
watermarking schemes, the area of watermarking for DSP algorithms is relatively new. 
Although some people have done a lot o f innovative work in this area, the proposals they 
have mentioned still have space for improvement, and the application fields o f those 
watermarking schemes need to be extended. DSP algorithms' FPGA implementation is 
today's hot-point in the consumer electronics market. FPGAs can provide hardware based 
fully parallel data processing ability, which makes the FPGAs good candidates for ultra- 
high speed and high volume throughout DSP applications, like wireless applications, 
wide band network, etc.
The filter magnitude modification scheme will introduce 7% hardware increase. The filter 
taps' equal replacement also have 29% hardware increase after watermarking. And the 
windowing function' watermarking scheme may be broken by adding false watermark at 
algorithm level. The current available FPGA watermarking methods also have some 
limitations. The look-up-table (LUT) watermarking scheme has been broken and the 
FPGA bit stream modification scheme is not fit for those engineers who do not have 
knowledge o f the format o f FPGA bit-stream data. The FPGA producers also announce 
that they will not expose such bit-stream format information to the public, for confidential 
reason and EP protection considerations. So to develop new and better watermarking 
schemes that can protect DSP algorithms' FPGA implementation becomes important.
In chapter 3, the FIR filter coefficients' modification watermarking scheme will be 
presented. The idea to modify the original image bitmap data and windowing function 
coefficients has been proposed by several papers [1][10][11]. The author o f this thesis 
extends the application area o f this idea to filter and other DSP algorithms. By embedding 
the coefficients into ASIC and FPGA hardware level, the security strength of 
watermarking scheme has been increased. In chapter 4, the watermarking through FPGA 
cell locations' constrain is introduced. This is an innovative watermarking scheme that 
works at FPGA layout level. This scheme uses the unique layout structure o f FPGA to 
embed watermark information into the FPGA cells' layout coordinates.
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Chapter 3: FIR Filter Coefficient 
Modification Watermarking
3.1. Watermarking Scheme
For the filter coefficients' LSB watermarking scheme, a designer who is responsible for 
the watermark embedding firstly needs to have the filter's coefficients' file. The designer 
will use the watermark bits to replace the filter coefficients' LSBs. After embedding o f the 
watermark, the designer needs to run simulation of the filter with the watermarked 
coefficients. If  the simulation results are acceptable, the designer will save the filter's 
coefficients to a new file and the watermarking flow ends here. For the watermark 
extraction, the designer needs to read out the filter's coefficients, find the watermark 
locations and extract their LSBs. After that, he can obtain the watermark bit sequence.
Let a FIR filter design be given by:
Y(k)=A0*x(k)+A 1 *x(k-1)+....... +An-l*x(k-N-l), where k=0,l,........ ,N-1.
Here AO, A l ,  , An-1 are filter coefficients. A watermark, for instance, is 10001010.
Watermark embedding process is to replace the filter coefficients’ LSBs with the 
watermark bits. Table 1 shows the procedure o f watermark embedding by replacing filer 
coefficients' LSBs.
Table 1 FIR Filter Coefficients' LSB Watermarking Scheme
Original Filter Coefficients Modified Filter Coefficients Watermark bits
A0: 1111-1111-1100-0100 A0: 1111-1111-1100-0101 1
A l: 1111-1111-0100-1101 A l: 1111-1111-0100-1100 0
A2: 1111-1111-1010-1001 A2: 1111-1111-1010-1000 0
A3: 0000-0000-1110-1010 A3: 0000-0000-1110-1010 0
A4: 0000-0011-0111-1000 A4: 0000-0011-0111-1001 1
A5: 0000-1000-1101-1111 A5: 0000-1000-1101-1110 0
A6: 0000-0001-1111-1010 A6: 0000-0001-1111-1011 1
A7: 1111-1110-0101-0110 A7: 1111-1110-0101-0110 0
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The watermark embedding flow o f filter coefficient modification is concluded in the 
following paragraph:
Schemel.arWatermark Embedding by Filter Coefficients' Modification
Input: Filter design specifications, watermark bits that need to be embedded
Output: Watermarked filter design
Step 1.Design filter by using filter design specifications.
Step 2:Obtain digitized filter coefficients with specific word length.
Step 3:Modify filter's coefficients' LSBs according to watermark bits 
Step 4:Use the modified filter coefficients as the simulation inputs o f the filter design tool. 
Verify weather the filter's response satisfies the design specification or not.
4.1.If  yes, output the watermarked filter's coefficients, stop the procedure.
4.2.If no, check weather we can increase the filter's coefficients or not.
4.2.1.If yes, go to Step 2.
4.2.2.If no, stop the procedure.
The watermark extraction procedure is as following: The watermark extractor first reads 
out the filter's coefficients and get the LSBs of the coefficients. The binary sequence of 
the filter coefficients' LSBs is the watermark information. For the improvement of the 
watermark scheme's security, the filter's coefficients need to be solidified into FPGA 
hardware by using ROM (read only memory) programming or hard-wiring (connect the 
signal lines with power or ground). So the designer needs to either read out the filter's 
coefficients from the ROM or find the internal hard-wired signals' value that are used as 
filter's coefficients. The following scheme shows the watermark extraction procedures. 
Schemel.b: Watermark Extraction for Filter Coefficients' Modification 
Input: Filter coefficients (binary format), watermark bits that need to be verified 
Output: Embedded watermark/copyright confidence 
Step 1. Extract the filter coefficients LSBs.
Step 2:Read out the LSBs within the specific range where the watermark supposed to be 
added.
Step 3:Compare the LSBs read from the filter coefficients with the original watermark 
bits, check how many bits match and get their match rate.
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3.2. Simulation of Coefficients’ LSB Watermarking
To evaluate the effectiveness of proposal one, FIR filter LSBs’ watermarking, the author 
makes the simulation to check the filter performance degradation after watermarking. 
Commercial filter design and simulation tool is used to carry the simulation. Here are the 
filter's original design specifications:







The Matlab FDA (Filter Design and Analysis) tool is used to design the original filter and 
create the filter magnitude response before and after the watermarking. By reading out the 
magnitude response after watermarking, the difference o f Wpass and Wstop o f the filter 
before and after watermarking are less than 0.1 dB.
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From the simulation results, we can see that FIR filter coefficients’ LSB watermarking 
method will introduce some degree of performance degradation. The author also carries 
the simulation for the watermarking of the same FIR filter with 8-bit coefficients. But the 
simulation results show that the magnitude distortion is too large and unacceptable. So for 
8-bit coefficients case, the LSB watermarking scheme introduces too large magnitude 
response change. 16-bit watermarking case works well, with quite small magnitude 
response degradation. Coefficients’ LSB watermarking method can also be extended to 
other DSP algorithms that have a sequence o f parameters.
3.3.Watermarking Performance Analysis
To evaluate the watermarking scheme's performance for proposal one, the author uses the 
evaluation items that have been introduced in chapter 2. The evaluation results will also 
be used for the summarizations that are made at the end of this chapter.
Embedding Efficiency: 1 bit/tap. From the watermarking method, we can embed one bit 
o f information with each filter coefficient. The maxim number of watermarking bits that 
can be embedded to the filter's coefficients is equal to the number of the filter's taps. 
Embedding Cost: The embedding procedure is simple and direct. The designer can 
modify the filter's coefficients' LSBs by using normal text editors, like notepad or so. 
There is no hardware or timing punishment for this method.
Design Overhead: There is no design overhead for the filter design itself. The watermark 
is added after the filter design has been finished. But the designer who embeds the 
watermark needs to run simulation after watermarking to verify the filter's performance 
degradation is acceptable or not.
Extraction Cost: The extraction procedure is direct and simple. People just need to read 
out the filter's coefficients' LSBs and get the watermark bit sequence.
Probability o f  Coincidence (Pu):If we use all available coefficients' LSB for 
watermarking, the probability o f coincidence equals to l/(2An)), where n is the number of 
filter taps. For the 8-bit watermark and 8-tap filter case, this number equals to 1/256. For 
128-bit watermark, this number equals to 3.4E-38.
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Security Strength: For those DSP algorithms whose coefficients have been programmed 
into non-erasable memory (ROM) or implemented through hard wiring, this method 
provides very strong security strength. The attacker will have no way to remove the 
watermark embedded inside the coefficients' LSBs unless he removes the ASIC or FPGA 
chip.
Applied Area: This method can be applied to filter algorithms, as well as DSP algorithms' 
ASIC/FPGA implementation that have sequential parameters. The filter coefficients or 
other parameters should be solidified into the hardware.
Filter Performance Degradation: The filter performance degradation is decided by the 
filter coefficients' word-length. For 16-bit FIR filter case, the magnitude degradation is 
less than O.ldB.
Probability o f  Detection Miss (Pm): From the watermark detection procedure, we can see 
that the probability of a detection miss is O.The extractor can always successfully extract 
the watermark information by reading out the filter's coefficients' LSBs.
Table 2 Comparisons between Filter Coefficient Modification Watermarking and 














Medium Small Small Small
Hardware 
Usage Increase
+7% +29% N/A 0%
Design
Overhead
High Medium Low Low
Extraction
Cost
Low Medium Low Medium
Probability of 
Coincidence
Low Low Low Low
Security Medium Medium Low High
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The proposed filter coefficient's modification watermarking scheme shows better 
performance than other current available filter watermarking schemes with most 
performance items. The filter's hardware usage increase is 0% and is the major strong 
point for this new proposal. The design overhead is also low due to little additional design 
effort required for watermark embedding. The probability of coincidence is low due to the 
large amount o f watermark information that can be embedded inside the filter's 
coefficients. The security strength is quite high because o f the hardware solidation o f the 
watermark information, so to remove the watermark is physically impossible. All in all, 
the proposed filter coefficients' modification watermarking scheme shows good 
watermarking performance and has good potential for practical DSP algorithms' 
watermarking.
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Chapter 4: Watermarking Through 
FPGA Cell Location Constrain
The FPGA cell location constrain watermarking scheme uses the FPGA cells' x and y 
coordinates to embed the watermark information. This method belongs to the physical 
constrain watermarking method. By doing so, each selected FPGA layout cell for 
watermarking can embed 2 bits o f information. Several real world IPs like FIR filter, 
CDMA match filter, discrete cosine transform (DCT) are used to embed 8-bit watermark. 
The simulation results are used to verify the watermarking performance. Varied length 
watermark embedding are carried for the FIR filter to study the relationship between 
design overhead and watermark length.
4.1.Watermarking Scheme
The watermarking flow for this scheme is firstly set up some kind o f watermark 
embedding rules. Then the designer needs to select the FPGA layout cells that will be 
used for watermarking. After that, the designer makes the original implementation of the 
IP without watermarking. After this step, the selected FPGA cells will be moved 
according to the watermarking rules. And the FPGA implementation procedure will be 
carried again with these new layout location constrains. The finished layout o f the FPGA 
will contain the watermark information that the designer has embedded by constraining 
the cells' layout locations.
Let a FIR filter design be given by:
Y(k)=A0*X(k)+A 1 *X(k-1)+.......+An-1 *X(k-N-1),where k=0,l,....N -l.
Suppose we need to embed a watermark consists of 8 bits as 10001010. Let the RAM 
(random access memory) cells to store Ai be RAM_i, i=0,l,...,7. A RAM cell in FPGA 
layout can be identified by its coordinates (x, y). The watermark embedding rules are 
described as following:
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If the bits are 00, we choose both x and y as even.
If the bits are 01, we choose x as even and y as odd.
If the bits are 10, we choose x as odd and y as even.
If the bits are 11, we choose both x and y as odd.
Table 3 shows the procedure o f embedding watermark to RAM cells' location coordinates. 
Table 3 FPGA Cell Location Watermarking
RAM_i for Storing Ai Watermarking Bits New Location o f the 









Figure 9 FPGA Layout with 48*16 Slices Array
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For FPGA devices, the whole layout is divided into certain number of slices, (see figure 9) 
There are route path between slices. Each slice has some kind o f logic resources, like 16- 
bit RAMs, look-up tables, D-type flip-flops and so on. Different types of FPGA devices 
will have different number of slices available, as well as the logic cells' type and amount 
within each slice. For watermarking purpose, we can use the logic cells like 16-bit RAM, 
D-type flip-flop or other kind of logic cells to embed the watermark information. The 
selection o f the cells should satisfy that each cell used for watermarking does not occupy 
more than one FPGA slice.
Scheme 2.a.Watermark Embedding Flow of FPGA Cell Location Modification
Input: Original FPGA logic and layout design and design specifications, watermark bits 
need to be embedded 
Output: Watermarked FPGA layout design
Step l.Try to find FPGA layout RAM cells that have sequential relations from the logic 
view.
1.1.If we can find, from these RAM layout cells,
1.1.1 .Try to find layout cells that occupy less than 1/4 FPGA slices. If we can 
find them, go to step 2.
1.1.2.Try to find layout cells that occupy less than or equal 1 FPGA slices.
If we can find them, go to step 2.
If  we cannot, stop the procedure.
1.2.If we cannot, stop the procedure.
Step 2.Select layout cells locating at loose place and route area.
2.1 .From the cells we find in step 1 ,try to find those cells locating at unused 
place and route areas.
2.1.1.If we can find them, go to step 3.
2.1.2.If we cannot, go to step 2.2.
2.2.From the cells we find in step l,try to find those cells locating at loose 
place and route areas.
2.2.1. If we can find them, go to step 3.
2.2.2.If we cannot, use the cells we find in step 1 and go to step 3.
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Step 3.From the layout cells we find in step 2, select layout cells locating at parallel logic 
paths.
3.1 .If we can find them, go to step 4.
3.2.If we cannot, use the cells we find in step 2 and go to step 4.
Step 4.From the layout cells we find in step 3, select layout cells locating at non-critical 
logic paths.
4.1.If  we can find them, go to step 5.
4.2.If we cannot, use the layout cells we find in step 3 and go to step 5.
Step 5.For every selected watermarking cell, try to find new location for re-locating that 
satisfies watermarking bit and watermarking rules.
5.1 .Try to find spare layout slice within one slice distance.
5.1.1.If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.1.2.If  we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within two slices distance.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.1 .n.If we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within n slices distance. Here
n is the largest slice number o f possible movement.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.2.If  we cannot find it, try to swap this layout cell with another layout cell that is 
not selected as watermarking cell and within one slice location.
5.2.1 .If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6. 
5.2.2.If we cannot, try to find such layout cell within two slices distance.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.2.n.If we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within n slices distance. Here 
n is the largest slice number o f possible swap .
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
If we cannot, stop the procedure.
Step 6.Run place and route with the watermarked layout cell locations.
Step 7.Read out the place and route report after watermarking. Verify weather the 
watermarked layout implementation satisfies the design specification or not.
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7.1.If yes, output the layout and create the bit-streaming data, stop the procedure.
7.2.If no, check weather all possible layout cell candidates for watermarking have 
been tried or not.
7.2.1.If yes, stop the procedure.
7.2.2.If no, go to step 1 and find new watermarking candidates.
The above paragraph shows the watermarking flow of FPGA RAM cell locations' 
watermarking schemes. This watermarking flow can also be applied to DSP algorithms' 
watermarking. The requirement is that the DSP algorithm has some kind o f sequence of 
parameters that can be implemented with hardware. If the DSP algorithm does not have 
such kind o f sequential parameters, only the FPGA cell location modification proposal 
can be applied.
Here the FIR filter's coefficients' LSB watermarking and the RAM cell locations' 
watermarking are used as examples. The proposal o f FIR filter coefficient modification 
watermarking also can be extended to any DSP algorithms that have sequential structure 
o f parameters and the parameters can be solidified into the FPGA hardware (For example, 
the filter's coefficients are programmed into the ROMs within FPGA chips. Another way 
to solidify the parameters with hardware is hard wiring. For example, when the filter's 
coefficients' bit is 0, this bit-line will be connected with ground. When the filter's 
coefficients' bit is 1, this bit-line will be connected with pow er.) The second proposal can 
be extended to any pure digital logic IP's FPGA implementation as long as these digital 
IPs have some kind o f sequential structure of layout cells. The DES/AES encryption 
function is provided by the FPGA implementation tool [16].
Scheme 2.b.FIR Filter FPGA Cell Location Watermark Extraction Flow
Input: Watermarked FPGA layout design, original watermark bits that have be embedded
Output: Watermark embedded within FPGA layout design
Step l.Find the layout locations o f RAM cells storing FIR filter coefficients
Step 2. Extract RAM cells' (x, y) location labels.
Step 3. Using cell location watermarking rules to extract the embedded watermark.
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Step 4. Compare the embedded watermark with the original watermark, get copyright 
confidence measure.
The above scheme shows the watermark extraction flow. Here the FIR filter's coefficients' 
LSB watermarking and FPGA RAM cell location watermarking schemes have been used 
to embed the watermarks inside the FIR filter's coefficients and RAM cell locations' 
coordinates. The extractor needs to extract the watermarks inside the FPGA layout as well 
as FIR filter's coefficients. The extractor will be given the complete original logic design 
files containing all the schematics and placement/route files. The watermark extractor will 
also be given the FPGA design and debug software that are used to design and implement 
the original FIR filter design.
During the watermark extraction flow, the extractor firstly needs to find the layout 
locations o f the RAM cells that store FIR filter's coefficients. The extractor can use the 
original logic and layout design files to search these RAM cells between logic schematic 
and layout. Then he will be able to extract the RAM cells' x and y coordinates. After that 
the extractor can use the RAM cells' x and y coordinates to get the embedded watermark 
information, by referencing the watermark embedding rules. After that he also can read 
out the RAM cell's contents by applying correct address and read signals to the FPGA 
chip and get the FIR filter's coefficients. After reading out the coefficients' LSBs, he gets 
the watermark that has been embedded into the FIR filter's coefficients LSBs.
4.2.FPGA Cell's Location Watermarking Simulation 
Procedures and Results
This section describes the simulation results for embedding 8-bit watermark to different 
FPGA devices as well as embedding different length watermark (from 8-bit to 128-bit) 
into the FIR filter design. The watermarking procedures are described step by step. To 
compare with the results from paper [21], the author o f this thesis also selects the Xilinx 
FPGA device and its implementation tools.
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4.2.1. Embedding 8-bit Watermark: Virtex-II device
The FIR filter has the following specifications:
Single rate single channel FIR filter
Number o f taps: 8
Coefficient width: 16-bit
Coefficient data type: signed
Coefficients reload ability: yes
Input data width: 16-bit, signed
Output data width: 32-bit, signed
Implementation type: fully serial, conventional structure
The FPGA implementation software tool environments are:
Design and Implementation tool: Xilinx ISE (integrated silicon environment) 4.2
Design Flow: VHDL
Synthesis tool: XST VHDL
Floor plan tool: Xilinx Floor Planer
Place and route optimization goal: timing
Target FPGA device: Xilinx Virtex-II, XCV250, speed grade -6
Simulation Procedures:
Stepl: Input the FIR filter design into the ISE design tool.
Figure 10 FIR Filter's Schematic Diagram
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Step 2:Synthesis the FIR filter using XST VHDL
Step 3:Place and route the FIR filter without location constrains. After this step, we will 
get the FPGA place and route result with timing optimization.
Step 4:Suppose the registers that store filter's coefficient AO’s 4 LSBs are register 0-3, 
respectively. In this case, the registers will be used to embed the watermark. The registers 
are used to implement the function o f RAM cells. We will re-assign these 4 registers with 
following new slice locations:
RegisterO: Slice (13,26)------->(13,26)
R egisterl: Slice (13,26)------->(12,22)
Register2: Slice (5, 23)-------->(5,20)
Register3: Slice (5, 23)-------- >(5,20)
Step 5:Run placement and route again with watermark location constrains, get the new 
layout with watermark inside. In this case, we only move the cells that we need to use for 
watermarking and do not change the locations of those cells that have not been used for 
watermarking.
Figure 11 Original Layout of the FIR Filter, Virtex-II Device
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Figure 12 Watermarked Layout of the FIR Filter, 8-bit Watermark, Virtex-II
Device
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From the layouts o f the FIR filter before and after watermarking, it is quite hard to find 
the locations o f the watermark by only observing the watermarked layout. This is the 
property o f the transparency of the watermark. This property makes it more difficult to 
detect and remove the watermark from the FPGA layout by potential attackers. (Here we 
suppose the potential attacker does not have access to the original layout of the FIR filter. 
Because by comparing the original and after watermarking layouts, the difference can be 
easily identified. If the attacker already has access to the original layout, it is not 
necessary for him to attack the watermark anymore.)
The selection o f cells' new locations is decided by the author with referencing the original 
optimization layout location placement results to make as small distance change as 
possible. This will help to achieve better timing performance. After implementing both 
the design, the author gets the timing reports, (see appendix A and B), to find the detailed 
timing delay information. The author also gets the place and route reports (see appendix 
C and appendix D) that show the hardware usage information before and after 
watermarking.
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The following table shows the results o f the two implementations on Virtex II device, 
before watermarking and after watermarking, with 8-bit watermark embedding.







Before watermarking 4.441 ns 9.289 ns 107.654 MHz 488/1536
After watermarking 4.441 ns 9.392 ns 106.474 MHz 489/1536
So after watermarking, the FIR filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(9.392-9.289)/9.289 = +  1.109 %
Hardware cost increase by :(489-488)/488 = + 0.205 %
The movement o f the registers introduces the timing delay increase from their timing 
optimization results. And the hardware cost increase is caused by the movement of 
registers to spare slices. Before watermarking, these registers share slices with other logic 
cells. When certain register is moved to a spare slice and cannot share with other logic 
cells that are not used for watermarking, the hardware cost will increase by one FPGA 
slice. If  we can find such slice that can satisfy the watermarking rule and is shared by the 
logic cells that will not be used for watermarking, the hardware cost will not change.
4.2.2. FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit watermark, Virtex II Pro device 
Table 5 FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit, Virtex II PRO Device
Maxim net 
delay





3.210ns 5.593ns 178.795MHz 488/1536
After
watermarking
2.947ns 5.540ns 180.505MHz 490/1536
So after watermarking, the FIR filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(5.540-5.593)/5.593 = - 0.948 %
Hardware cost increases by (490-488)7488 = + 0.410 %
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4.2.3. FIR Filter Watermarking, Watermark Length Varying from 8 bits to 128 bits, 
Virtex II Device
To study the relationships of the length o f the watermark and the FPGA implementation 
results, several implementations o f the watermark whose length varies from 8 bits to 128 
bits are carried. Firstly the author uses Matlab to create 128 bits o f random number 
sequence. Then the author uses the FIR filter's registers that store the coefficients to 
embed the watermark, using watermark embedding rules. The registers are selected and 
used from the register that store FIR filter's coefficient AO, then the register that store FIR 
filter's coefficient A l, so on and so forth.
Table 6 FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit to 128-bit, Virtex II Device
Watermark
length







0 4.441 9.289 107.654 488
8 bits 4.934 13.866 72.119 489
16 bits 4.941 13.866 72.119 488
32 bits 4.934 13.866 72.119 495
64 bits 4.941 13.866 72.119 498
128 bits 5.504 13.866 72.119 510
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The following figure shows the relationship between watermark length and maxim net 
delay:
Figure 13 FIR Filter Watermark Length & Max Net Delay Relation
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From Figure 16 we can see that when the watermark length changes from 8 bits to 64 bits, 
the max net delay keeps nearly the same. As the author explains later in this chapter, the 
increase o f the timing delay that happens at different logic path will not accumulate all 
together according to simple addition operation relation. As long as the timing increase 
happening within watermarked logic paths is smaller than the max net delay path's timing 
delay, the max net delay for the FPGA will not change. If the later on watermark cells' 
movement introduces net delay increase that overpasses the original max net delay, the 
final max net delay for the FPGA chip will increase further.
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The following figure shows the relation between watermark length and Maxim frequency: 
Figure 14 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Max Frequency 
Relation
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From figure 14, we can see that the max frequency does not change when the embedding 
watermark length changes from 8-bit to 128-bit. The max frequency is decided by the 
minim period o f the FPGA chip.
Figure 15 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Hardware Usage Relation
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From figure 15, the after all tendency is that the hardware usage o f the FPGA after 
watermarking increases when the watermark length increases. When we need to embed 
longer watermark, we need more spare FPGA slices to re-assign the watermarking FPGA 
cells. If we cannot find the slices that we can share the watermarking FPGA cells with 
the cells that have not been selected for watermarking usage, the hardware usage will 
increase.
Figure 16 FIR Filter Cell Movement Distance Distribution, 128-bit Watermark
25 FPG A  Slice Num ber (slice) _________
FPG A  Slice M ovem ent Distance From Original Location (slice)
The cell movement distance used here means the difference between the cell's original x 
coordinate and the cell's x coordinate after watermarking, or the difference between the 
cell's original y coordinate and the cell's y coordinate after watermarking, whatever is the 
larger. To embed 128-bit watermark information, we need 64 FPGA cells for location 
watermarking usage. From Figure 19, we can see that 70%(45 cells out o f 64 cells) of the 
cell movements happen within one slice distance. And the longest movement is 11 slices.
4.2.4. FIR Filter Watermarking, Watermark Length Varying from 8-bit to 128-bit, 
Virtex II Device, Reverse Sequence
In this simulation, several implementations o f the watermark whose length varies from 8 
bits to 128 bits are also carried. The author uses the FIR filter's registers that store the 
coefficients to embed the watermark in reverse sequence. The registers are selected begin 
from the registers that store FIR filter's coefficient A15 (Firstly we will use the register
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that stores A15's MSB, then we will use the register that store A15's 15th bit, so on and so 
forth.) After we use up the registers that store A15, we will use registers that store FIR 
filter's coefficient A14. Finally we will use the registers for storing A12. (For 128 bits 
watermark embedding, we need 64 registers all together.)











0 4.441 9.289 107.654 488
8 bits 4.864 9.554 104.668 489
16 bits 4.864 9.554 104.668 489
32 bits 4.859 9.554 104.668 492
64 bits 4.859 9.554 104.668 494
128 bits 4.859 9.554 104.668 503
Figure 17 FIR Filter Watermark Length & Max Net Delay Relation, Reverse 
Sequence
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From Figure 17 we can see that when the watermarking length changes from 8-bit to 128- 
bit, the max net delay keeps nearly the same.
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Figure 18 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Max Frequency Relation, 
Reverse Sequence
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From figure 18, we can see that the max frequency does not change when the embedding 
watermark length changes from 8-bit to 128-bit. The max frequency is decided by the 
minim period o f the FPGA chip.
Figure 19 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Hardware Usage Relation, 
Reverse Sequence
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From figure 19, the tendency is that the hardware usage o f the FPGA after watermarking 
increases when the watermark length increases. Comparing with figure 18, we can see 
that for embedding same length watermark, the reverse embedding method cause less 
hardware usage increase.
Figure 20 FIR Filter Cell Movement Distance Distribution, 128-bit Watermark, 
Reverse sequence
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4.3.Watermarking Simulations for Other FPGA IPs
To evaluate the performance o f the FPGA cell locations' watermarking scheme, the 
author also makes several simulations for other types o f DSP algorithms' watermarking. 
These DSP algorithms include comb filter, CDMA match filter, DCT and waveform 
synthesizer. These DSP algorithms are among the most widely used DSP IP cores. 
Another non-DSP IP is also used to verify the applicability o f this proposal for general 
form digital IP's FPGA implementation's watermarking.
4.3.1. Comb Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Comb filters are widely used in image processing and signal up-sampling/down-sampling. 
Here are the comb filter IP's specifications:
Comb filter type: Interpolator 
Input bus width: 16-bit
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Number o f stages: 4 
Sample rate change: 16000 
Differential delay: 2
The following is the comb filter watermarking results with 8-bit watermark.
Table 8 Comb Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Min
Period








7.568ns 132.135MHz 7.911ns 3.918ns 501/1536
After
watermarking
7.538ns 132.661MHz 8.526ns 4.087ns 504/1536
So after watermarking, the comb filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(7.538-7.568)/7.568 = -0 .3 9 6  %
Hardware cost increases by (504-501)7501 = + 0.599 %
4.3.2.CDMA Match Filter Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
The CDMA match filter is also watermarked with 8-bit watermark.
The following table shows the implementation results before and after watermarking: 
Here the mem-16s cells (16-bit memory blocks) are used for watermarking.
Table 9 CDMA Match Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Min
Period








14.113ns 70.857MHz N/A 9.329ns 2T33/3072
After
watermarking
13.870ns 72.098MHz N/A 8.868ns 2133/3072
So after watermarking, the C DMA match filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(13.870-14.113)/14.113 = -  1.722 % 
Hardware cost increase by: (2133-2133)/2132 = + 0 %
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After watermarking, the FPGA's max frequency has been improved by 1.722% and the 
hardware usage does not change. The hardware usage does not change since the original 
mem-16 cells do not share slice with any other logic components. So the movements of 
these mem-16 cells do not increase the hardware usage.
4.3.3.DCT Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
The DCT IP is widely used for image processing. Here we use the 1-D DCT IP for 
watermarking.
This DCT IP has the following specifications:
Operation mode: Forward DCT (1-D)
Number o f points: 16 enable symmetry 
Performance: 9-clock cycles/sample 
Coefficients width: 8-bit 
Input data width: 8-bit, signed 
Precision control: Round 
Result width: 20
Table 10 DCT Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min
Period








7.068ns 141.483MHz 7.960ns 4.970ns 1173/1536
After
watermarking
7.804ns 128.139MHz 8.469ns 4.775ns 1173/1536
So after watermarking, the DCT's
Timing delay increases by :(7.804-7.068)/7.068 = +10.4 % 
Hardware cost increase by: (1173-1173)/1173 = + 0 %
4.3.4. Direct Waveform Synthesizer Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
The direct digital synthesizer can produce sine and cosine waveforms, without using 
look-up tables. It uses the iteration operations to create the sine and cosine waveforms.
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Its design specification are shown below:
Output width: 16-bit
Function :Output both sine and cosine waveforms
Memory type: Distributed ROM
Pipelined operation: Yes
Phase increment: Register based
Data width: 16-bit
Phase angle width: 4-bit
Phase offset: None
Noise shaping: No
In this case, the author uses the 16-bit distributed ROMs to embed the watermark 
information.
Table 11 Direct Waveform Synthesizer Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min
Period








4.3000ns 232.558MHz 6.919ns 3.864ns 34/1536
After
watermarking
4.261ns 234.687MHz 6.919ns 4.404ns 37/1536
So after watermarking, the direct waveform synthesizer's 
Timing delay increases by :(4.261-4.300)/4.300 = + 0.907 % 
Hardware cost increase by (37-34)/34 = + 8.82 %
4.3.5. Board Interface Circuit Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
From the discussion and simulation procedure, the FPGA cell location's watermarking 
method can also be used for other types o f IPs that have sequential logic structures.(For 
example, the IP we need to watermark has 8 registers in serial.)The watermarking 
simulation for non-DSP IP is also carried. The IP here is the interface circuit between the 
FPGA chip and personal computer, for test and debug purpose. The implementation 
results are shown as below:(Four D-type flip-flops are used to carry the 8-bit watermark 
information)
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Table 12 Board Interface Circuit Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min
Period








10.410ns 96.061MHz 13.484ns 2.602ns 192/256
After
watermarking
10.548ns 94.805MHz 13.948ns 2.602ns 192/256
So after watermarking,
Timing delay increases by :(10.548-10.410)/10.410 = +1.326 %
Hardware cost increase by (192-192)/ 192 = +0 %
There is 1.326% maxim working frequency decrease and the hardware usage does not 
change. The hardware usage does not change since the original D-type flip-flops do not 
share FPGA slice with other components. So the movements o f these D-type flip-flops do 
not increase the hardware usage.
4.4. Detail Watermarking Steps for Implementation 
Optimization
From the simulation, the author concludes that the following watermarking rules might 
help the designer to optimize the FPGA's timing performance after watermarking. These 
guild-lines give the designer some direction for implementation optimization during the 
watermarking procedure.
The designer should try to use the FPGA cells that locate along the border around the 
loose placement areas. Some times we will also have placement holes that in this area no 
FPGA hardware resource has been used. The designer should try to avoid using the 
FPGA cells that locate inside the dense place and route area. (We call these dense place 
and route area hot areas, just like the traffic jam  areas in modem big cities o f human 
being). To make such kind of selections will give us more selections for the new locations 
of watermark cells and may improve implementation results. If we use the cells that are 
inside the hot area, we will feel more difficult to find available new locations for 
watermarking within small slice movement distance.
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Figure 21 Holes and Dense Placement Areas of the CDMA Match Filter
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The designer also should try to use cells that locate at different logic paths.
Figure 22 FPGA Cell Selection Strategy
Figure 22 shows the logic structure o f an IP. We need to use some of the cells in this EP to 
embed the watermark. In order to reduce the timing delay as much as possible, we need,to 
select the cells smartly. Suppose the modification o f the cells (al, bl...) in this IP will 
introduce equal amount of timing delay Td to the final layout implementation. We should 
firstly use the cells locate on different path in parallel. For this case, we can use a l, b l, 
c l, ..., h i. Then we use a2, b2, c 2 ,..., h2. Then we will use a3, b3, c3, ..., h3. Finally we 
will use a6, b6, c6, ..., h6. The reason for this selection method is that the timing delay 
happening within the serial path will accumulate according to addition relation. And it 
will increase the total delay continuously. If we use a l, a2 and a3, we will get 3Td for the
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final timing delay increase. But if  we use a l, bl and c l, we will have Td only for the final 
timing delay increase. For digital logic design, the final maxim working frequency is 
decided by the slowest path's maxim timing delay. This makes us to use cells for 
watermarking in parallel instead o f in serial. But the fact is every IP design and its FPGA 
implementation is different, the effect o f moving the cells will be different. This makes 
the problem more complicated. But from the simulation results, most of the cells' 
movements happen within 2 slices' distance, so this method still has its value to some 
extent.
The designer should try to use small layout modules instead of big and solid layout cells. 
There is relationship between the layout design style and the watermarking difficulty. The 
higher the hardware usage percentage, the more difficult the watermarking procedure will 
be. When the FPGA hardware usage percentage increases, we will have less spare layout 
slices for re-assignment o f those watermark cells. And we need to move slices with 
longer distance to find the locations that satisfy the watermarking embedding rules. The 
worst case is that 100% of the FPGA slices have been used. We have no way but try to 
swap the locations o f the FPGA layout cells to re-assign the watermark cells. If we use 
big and solid layout cells, for example, the layout module that occupies 16 slices and can 
not be separated or re-placed and re-routed, we will have to overpass those large blocks 
during watermarking. And the average slice movement distance will increase. This will 
cause worse timing performance. In figure 23,we can see some kind o f large and solid 
layout cells like carry-chain and shift-register-chain. When we carry the watermarking 
operations, we need to overpass these cells to find the available new slices to assign the 
cells for watermarking. This increases the watermarking difficulty.
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Figure 23 FIR Filter Placement Diagram with Pre-solidified Layout Modules
The designer should try to find the slice to assign the watermarking component (register, 
for example) within one slice distance from the optimized location. If there is more than 
one slice candidate available, for fast embedding, he should arbitrarily choose one. For 
best result, he should try all the available candidates and run implementation for each 
case and select the best one. If  he cannot find the available slice within one slice distance, 
he should try to find such a slice within two slices distance away from the optimized slice 
location. Such kind o f search should be carried until one slice has been found or the 
search area has touched the boundary o f FPGA chip. This means the search step has 
failed. Under this condition, the designer may use cell swap technology to solve the 
problem. The designer should try to avoid using the components that are large logic 
blocks like multipliers. We should use those small components like gates or latches that 
can be implemented within single FPGA slice. The designer should also try to avoid 
using the components that are located on the critical path.
We have two different after-watermarking placement flows for the FPGA cell locations 
watermarking scheme after layout cell's selection.
The steps for first one are:
1.Place and route the original FPGA IP. 2.Select the cells we prefer to use for
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watermarking. 3.Re-assign layout slice locations for these cells that have not been used 
by the original placement. Tell the place and route tool "do not touch all cells" during 
following implementation process. So the place and route tool will not change the 
locations o f other cells that have not been selected for watermarking. 4.Run the 
implementation flow again and get the final layout with watermark.
The steps for second one are:
1.Place and route the original FPGA IP. 2.Select the cells we prefer to use for 
watermarking. 3.Re-assign layout slice locations for these cells, without considering these 
locations have been used by the original placement or not. In this step, the designer only 
use the smallest slice movement rule to make the selection. Tell the place and route tool 
"do not touch these watermarked cells" during implementation process. Let the place and 
route optimization tool to decide whether change the locations of other cells that have not 
been selected for watermarking or not. The optimization goal is timing. 4.Run the 
implementation flow again and get the final layout with watermark.
The difference between the first and second one is whether we allow the tool to change 
the locations o f the cells that we do not use for watermarking. If time is allowed, the 
designer can try both methods and select the one with better timing implementation 
results.
4.5. Watermarking Performance Analysis
Embedding Efficiency: 2 bits/cell. Since we can embed 2 bits to one FPGA cells' x and y 
coordinates.
Embedding Cost: The embedding o f watermark by assign FPGA cells with new locations 
is simple and fast. The designer can use the FPGA placement tool to carry this operation. 
No extra software is needed.
Design Overhead: For the 8-bit watermark and the FIR filter with 8 taps, the timing 
increase is 1.1% and the hardware cost increase is 0.2% (Virtex-II device case).
Extraction Cost: The extraction o f the watermark within the FPGA layout is fast and 
simple. We can use the design tool to load in the FPGA layout data after place and route,
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as well as the original design schematic files. Then we can use the search function of the 
FPGA CAD tool to find the locations o f the cells we have used for watermarking from 
schematic diagram. Then by using the embedding rules we can extract the watermark 
information from the cells' layout locations. The time to extract 8 bits o f watermark from 
the FIR filter layout is less than 5 minutes and no extra software is needed.
Probability o f  Coincidence (Pu): This figure is decided by watermark length. For 128-bit 
watermark, the probability o f coincidence is: l/(2A128)=3.4*10A(-38).
Security Strength: For anyone who wishes to detect/remove/modify/forgery the 
watermark information, they have several ways to do the attack. The first way is to 
observe the FPGA layout directly and try to find the watermark inside the FPGA layout. 
This method is quite difficult with today's FPGA processing technology. The reason is by 
using this method the optical microscope must be used to take the photos o f the FPGA 
layouts or using reverse analysis CAD tools to analysis the FPGA layouts. But the optical 
microscopes cannot easily be used to observe the layouts that are fabricated under 0.5um 
technology, which is the observation limit of normal optical microscopes. (The 
observation limit of optical microscopes is decided by the visible light's wavelength. By 
using shorter wavelength's light, like x-ray, the observation limit o f the microscope can be 
extended. But such kind of x-ray microscopes are much more expensive. For today's 
FPGA technology, most products are fabricated using 0.13um technology and the most 
advanced devices using 0.09um technology, like IBM and Xilinx's products.) Even the 
attacker can find more advanced technology that allows them to observe the FPGA 
layouts directly; they also cannot see the logics under 5 levels o f metal wirings. And not 
like ASICs, the wiring o f FPGAs is naturally very messy, as we can see from the layout 
after place and route. So technically the reverse engineering by optical observation of 
FPGA layouts is really difficult.
The second way the attacker can select is to attack the FPGA programming data and try to 
reverse out the logic netlist, do the place and route again, with new location constrains. 
By this way they can remove the embedded watermark within FPGA layout. By doing so, 
the attacker firstly need to break the 3-key 128-bit AES encryption algorithm. There is no 
known efficient enough algorithm to break AES encryption algorithm so far. Even the
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attacker can find the keys and can recover the original FPGA programming data; they still 
need to extract the logic netlist by using the FPGA programming binary data. Since the 
FPGA programming data only provide the connection information of the FPGA, the 
attacker need the detail format knowledge o f the FPGA bit-stream data to extract the logic 
netlist from the FPGA programming bit -stream data.
The FPGA factories keep this kind of knowledge confidential and do not expose to the 
public. And there is no hanker tool have been reported so far that can reverse the FPGA 
programming data to logic netlist by 100%. Some tools can reverse the logic netlist from 
FPGA programming bit-streams to 80% of the whole logic within reasonable computer 
hours. And the rest 15% is very difficult to extract and the final 5% is nearly impossible 
to extract.
Applied Area This method can be applied to FPGA implementations of DSP algorithms 
Filter or DSP Algorithm Performance Degradation’. There will not be any filter 
performance degradation, since we do not change the algorithm of the filter or DSP 
algorithms.
Probability o f  Detection Miss (Pm): From the watermark detection procedure, we can see 
that the probability o f a detection miss is 0. Since by providing the complete design files 
including the logic netlist and placement files, route files, the watermark extractor can 
always extract the watermark by using the search and debug functions o f the FPGA 
design tool.
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Table 13 Comparisons Between FPGA Cell Location Watermarking and 
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Medium Medium High Medium High Medium
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Medium Medium Medium Medium High Low
Extraction
Cost




Low Low Low Low Medium Low











The proposed FPGA cell locations' watermarking scheme shows good watermarking 
performance comparing with current ASIC/FPGA watermarking schemes. Since the 
watermark is added at layout level, the lowest level o f FPGA design, the robustness o f 
watermark has been improved. The design overhead is low since the watermarking 
procedure is carried after the original design has been finished. The extraction cost is not 
that high, because the person to extract the watermark can use the search function of the 
FPGA design CAD tool. The probability o f coincidence is quite low due to the large 
amount o f watermark information we can embed into the FPGA layout. And no extra 
software is required for the watermark embedding and extraction, making this scheme fit 
for companies wish to watermark their design without buying new software. All in all, the
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proposed FPGA cell location's watermarking scheme shows good overall watermarking 
performance and may be commercially used for protection of today's FPGA designs.
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Chapter 5: Summary o f Contributions and 
Possible Future Work
In this thesis, two new watermarking schemes have been proposed. The first one is the 
filter coefficient modification watermarking. This scheme embeds watermark information 
into the filter's coefficients. The watermarked filter's coefficients are then embedded into 
the FPGA design by hardwiring or ROM programming. The second proposal is the FPGA 
layout cell locations' watermarking. This method embeds the watermark information into 
the FPGA cells' layout location coordinates. The simulation results show that the both 
schemes have relatively high performance and are very suitable for practical FPGA IP 
copyright protection.
The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Have extended the still image watermarking method o f the pixel’s LSB 
modification to filter and other DSP algorithms (at algorithm and lower levels). 
We have shown that the new method has much high security strength since the 
watermarked data can be hardwired or written into ROM.
• Have proposed a novel FPGA layout cell location watermarking scheme that can 
be used for FPGA design IP protection. It has been shown by the simulation 
results the proposed scheme has better watermarking performance, extremely low 
overheads and high security strength, compared to the previous FPGA methods.
• Have made in depth state-of-art literature survey in the areas o f IP protection and 
watermarking technology.
Future work may include ASIC layout watermarking, FPGA watermark embedding 
optimization, printed circuit board (PCB) designs' protection, and FPGA/ASIC place and 
route algorithms that integrate watermark embedding and optimization procedures.
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Appendix A Timing Report for the FIR Filter's Original Implementation
Release 4.2i - Trace E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.
tree -e 3 -1 3 -xml top top.ned -o top.twr top.pcf
Design file: top.ned
Physical constraint file: top.pcf
Device, speed : xc2v250,-6 (ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02)
Report level: error report
Timing constraint: Default period analysis 
16528 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Minimum period is 9.289ns._________________________________
Timing constraint: Default net enumeration 
1726 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Maximum net delay is 4.441ns.
All constraints were met.
Data Sheet report:
All values displayed in nanoseconds (ns)
Setup/Hold to clock m ultiplierclk
 + + +
| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
------------------+_-------------+.. ----------- +
multipler_sclr 2.836(R)| 0.660(R)|
xn<0> | 0.432(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10> | 0.350(R)| 0.000(R)|
x n < ll>  j 0.169(R) 0.013(R)|
xn<12> j 0.846(R) 0.000(R)|
xn<13> 0.770(R)| 0.000(R)
xn<14> j 0.440(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<15> | 0.085(R)| 0.097(R)
xn<l> | -0.319(R)| 0.501(R)|
xn<2> 0.281(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<3> j 0.460(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<4> | -0.567(R)| 0.749(R)|
xn<5> | -0.572(R)| 0.754(R)|
xn<6> j 0.563(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<7> | -0.386(R)| 0.568(R)|
xn<8> j -0.151 (R)J 0.333(R)|
xn<9> j -0.119(R)| 0.301 (R)|
. + ................................. — + ..........................................+
Setup/Hold to clock xlxn_150 
 + + +
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Setup to | Hold to
Source Pad | elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
----------------- ------------+----- ------- +
xlxn_138<0> | 0.017(R)| 0.165(R)[
xlxn_138<10> | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
xlxn_138<ll> -0.266(R)| 0.448(R)|
xlxn_138<12> | 0.670(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<13> -0.438(R)| 0.620(R)|
xlxn_138<14> | 0.029(R)| 0.153(R)|
xlxn_138<15> -0.475(R)| 0.657(R)|
xlxn_138<l> | 0.299(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<2> | -0.093(R)| 0.275(R)|
xlxn_138<3> | -0.340(R)| 0.522(R)|
xlxn_138<4> | -0.564(R)| 0.746(R)|
xlxn_138<5> | -0.334(R)| 0.516(R)|
xlxn_138<6> | 0.158(R)| 0.024(R)|
xlxn_138<7> | -0.385(R)| 0.567(R)|
xlxn_138<8> | -0.317(R)| 0.499(R)|
xlxn_138<9> | -0.116(R)| 0.298(R)|
xlxn_147 | 2.314(R)| 0.371(R)|
- .......................................................+ - ----------- +------------- +
Setup/Hold to clock xn_load_clk
— — — — —— ---------  4*
Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad | elk (edge) elk (edge)
.+------------- +_.----------- +
xlxn_39 | 0.184(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_44 | -0.852(R)| 1.034(R)|
xlxn_45 | -1.138(R)| 1.320(R)|
xlxn_50 | -0.834(R)| 1.016(R)|
xlxn_52 -0.426(R)| 0.608(R)|
xlxn_54 | 0.186(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<0> | 0.596(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10> | -0.359(R)| 0.541 (R)|
xn< ll> 0.456(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<12> 1 -0.114(R)| 0.296(R)|
xn<13> | 0.397(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<14> | 0.664(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<15> | 0.592(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<l> | 0.045(R)| 0.137(R)|
xn<2> | 0.731 (R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<3> | 0.751 (R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<4> | -0.380(R)| 0.562(R)
xn<5> | -0.179(R)| 0.361 (R)|
xn<6> | -0.378(R)| 0.560(R)|
xn<7> | -0.090(R)| 0.272(R)|
xn<8> | 0.146(R)| 0.036(R)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xn<9> | 0.190(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn_preload | 1.503(R)| 1.253(R)|
xn_serial_in | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
---------------- -f---------------- t ---------- -h
Clock adder elk to Pad
— +-------------+
| elk (edge) |
Destination Pad| to PAD
yn<0> | 8.597(R)|
yn<10> | 8.855(R)|
yn<l1> | 8.671 (R)|





























Clock to Setup on destination clock adder_clk
 +  + +  +  +
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:RisejDest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
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 + ----------- + ----------+ -----------+ ------------+
adder_clk | 5.1511 | | |
multiplier_clk | 5.431 j | | |
 + - -------------+ -------------+ - .................+ — ..............+
Clock to Setup on destination clock multiplier_clk
 +-----------+--------- +---------- + ----------- +
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
-  +-----------+ --------- + ---------- +-----------+
multiplier_clk | 9.3931 | | |
xlxn_150 | 3.003| | | |
xn_load_clk | 3.135| | | |
-  - + --------------+ -----------+ -------------+ ---------------+
Clock to Setup on destination clock xlxn_150 
  ---------------  + -------------- + ---------------- 4 ------------------- 4-
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
-----------------f----------- -f----* -f-------- -f----------- +
xlxn_150 | 2.769| | | |
  + ------------+ ---------+ -----------+ ------------ +
Clock to Setup on destination clock xn_load_clk
 + ------------+ ---------+ -----------+ ------------ +
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
  - + ------------- + ---------- + ------------ + --------------+
xn_load_clk | 2.9911 | | |
  +---------+----------+-----------
WARNING:Timing:2554 - Clock nets using non-dedicated resources were found in this 
design. Clock skew on these resources will not be automatically addressed during path 
analysis. To create a timing report that analyzes 
clock skew for these paths, run tree with the '-skew' option.
The following clock nets use non-dedicated resources: 
xn_load_clk_IBUF adder_clk_IBUF multiplier_clk_IBUF 
xlxn_150_IBUF 
Timing summary:
Timing errors: 0 Score: 0
Constraints cover 16528 paths, 1726 nets, and 2993 connections (100.0% coverage) 
Design statistics:
M inimum period: 9.289ns (M aximum frequency: 107.654MHz)
M aximum net delay: 4.441ns
Analysis completed Tue Mar 09 21:29:03 2004
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Appendix B Timing Report for the FIR Filter Implementation with 8-bit 
Watermarking
Release 4.2i - Trace E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved, 
tree -e 3 -1 3 -xml top top.ned -o top.twr top.pcf 
Design file: top.ned
Physical constraint file: top.pcf
Device,speed: xc2v250,-6 (ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02)
Report level: error report
WARNING:Timing:2491 - No timing constraints found, doing default enumeration. 
Timing constraint: Default period analysis 
16528 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Minimum period is 9.392ns._______________________________________________
Timing constraint: Default net enumeration 
1726 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Maximum net delay is 4.441ns.
All constraints were met.
Data Sheet report:
All values displayed in nanoseconds (ns)
Setup/Hold to clock multiplier_clk
 +  +  +
| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad | elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
----------- +
m ultiplersclr | 2.836(R) 0.660(R)|
xn<0> | 0.432(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10> | 0.350(R)| 0.000(R)|




xn<15> j  0.085(R) 0.097(R)|
xn<l> | -0.319(R)| 0.501(R)|
xn<2> | 0.281 (R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<3> | 0.460(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<4> -0.567(R)| 0.749(R)|
xn<5> | -0.572(R) 0.754(R)|
xn<6> 0.563(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<7> | -0.386(R)| 0.568(R)|
xn<8> | -0.151(R)| 0.333(R)|
xn<9> | -0.283(R)| 0.465(R)|
—4'——
Setup/Hold to clock xlxn_150
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— + --------------------- 4 ------------------------ f
Setup to j Hold to |
Source Pad | elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
------------------+~ ----------- +------- -------+
xlxn_138<0> | 0.017(R)| 0.165(R)|
xlxn_138<10> | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
xlxn_138<ll> | -0.266(R)| 0.448(R)
xlxn_138<12> | 0.838(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<13> | -0.423(R)| 0.605(R)|
xlxn_138<14> -0.025(R)| 0.207(R)|
xlxn_138<15> | -0.219(R) 0.401 (R)|
xlxn_138<l> | 0.299(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<2> | -0.093(R)| 0.275(R)|
xlxn_138<3> | -0.424(R)| 0.606(R)
xlxn_138<4> | -0.564(R)| 0.746(R)|
xlxn_138<5> | -0.334(R) 0.516(R)
xlxn_138<6> | 0.158(R)| 0.024(R)|
xlxn_138<7> | -0.385(R)| 0.567(R)|
xlxn_138<8> | -0.317(R)| 0.499(R)|
xlxn_138<9> | -0.116(R)| 0.298(R)|
xlxn_147 | 1.321 (R)| 0.560(R)|
.+ +  +
Setup/Hold to clock xn_load_clk
 + + +
| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad elk (edge) | elk (edge)
------------------------+. -----------------+ . . --------------- +
xlxn_39 | 0.184(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_44 j -0.852(R)| 1.034(R)|
xlxn_45 | -1.138(R)| 1.320(R)
xlxn_50 j -0.834(R)| 1.016(R)|
xlxn_52 j -0.426(R)| 0.608(R)|
xlxn_54 j -0.319(R)j 0.501 (R)|
xn<0> | 0.596(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10> | -0.359(R)| 0.541 (R)|
x n < ll>  | 0.456(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<12> j -0.114(R)| 0.296(R)|
xn<13> | 0.397(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<14> | 0.664(R)| 0.000(R)
xn<15> | 0.592(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<l> | 0.045(R)| 0.137(R)|
xn<2> | 0.731 (R)| 0.000(R)
xn<3> j 1.185(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<4> | -0.380(R)| 0.562(R)|
xn<5> | -0.179(R)| 0.361 (R)|
xn<6> j -0.378(R)| 0.560(R)|
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xn<7> | -0.090(R)| 0.272(R)|
xn<8> | 0.146(R)| 0.036(R)|
xn<9> | 0.156(R)| 0.026(R)|
xn_preload | 1.675(R)| 1.253(R)|
xn_serial_in | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)| 
 +-------------+------------ +
Clock adder_clk to Pad
 +------------- +
| elk (edge)|





yn<12> | 8.921 (R)|
yn<13> | 8.560(R)
yn<14> | 8.405(R)|



























Clock to Setup on destination clock adder_clk
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
------------------------------+ ----------------- + ------------------+ ------------------ -f--------------------+
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
 +---------- + ---------- + ---------- + -----------+
adder_clk | 5.1511 | | |
multiplier_clk | 5.4311 | | |
 +----------+----------+----------+---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock multiplier_clk
 + ---------- + ---------- + ---------- +-----------+
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
 +----------+----------+----------+---------- +
multiplier_clk | 9.3931 | | |
xlxn_150 | 3.003| | | |
xn_load_clk | 3.187| | | |
 +----------+----------+----------+---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock xlxn_150
 + ---------- + ---------- + ---------- +-----------+
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
 +----------+----------+----------+---------- +
xlxn_150 | 2.787J | | |
 +----------+----------+----------+---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock xn_load_clk
 +----------+---------- + ---------- + -----------+
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
 + ---------- + -----------+ -----------+ ----------- +
xn_load_clk | 2.804| | | |
------------------ 4-—  -----“I*— —-----+ ---------- 4-— --------4-
WARNING: Timing: 2554 - Clock nets using non-dedicated resources were found in this 
design. Clock skew on these resources will not be automatically addressed during path 
analysis. To create a timing report that analyzesclock skew for these paths, run tree with 
the '-skew' option.The following clock nets use non-dedicated resources: 
xn_load_clk_IBUF adder_clk_IBUF multiplier_clk_IBUF 
xlxn_150_IBUF
Timing summary:______________________________________________________________
Timing errors: 0 Score: 0
Constraints cover 16528 paths, 1726 nets, and 2995 connections (100.0% coverage) 
Design statistics:
M inimum period: 9.392ns (Maximum frequency: 106.474MHz)
M aximum net delay: 4.441ns
Analysis completed Tue Mar 09 21:43:53 2004
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Appendix C Place and Route Report Before Watermarking of FIR Filter
Release 4.2i - Par E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.
Tue Mar 09 21:26:49 2004 
par -f  _par.rsp
Constraints file: top.pcf
Loading design for application par from file par_temp.ncd.
"top" is an NCD, version 2.37, device xc2v250, package csl44, speed -6 
Loading device for application par from file '2v250.nph' in environment 
D:/Xilinx.
Device speed data version: ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02.
Device utilization summary:
Number o f External IOBs 78 out o f  92 84%
Number o f LOCed External IOBs 0 out o f 78 0%
Number o f MULT 18X18s 8 out o f 24 33%
Number of SLICEs 488 out of 1536 31 %
Overall effort level (-ol): 5 (set by user)
Placer effort level (-pi): 5 (set by user)
Placer cost table entry (-t): 1
Router effort level (-rl): 5 (set by user)
Extra effort level (-xe): 0 (set by user)
Starting Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 12 secs 
Finished Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 12 secs 
Automatic resolution of clock placement was successful.
It was not necessary to constrain the placement o f any o f  the logic driven by 
the global clocks with the current clock placement.______________________
## Automatic clock placement completed.
Starting clustering phase. REAL time: 13 secs 
Finished clustering phase. REAL time: 15 secs 
Starting Mincut Placer. REAL time: 15 secs 
Finished Mincut Placer. REAL time: 16 secs 
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Total REAL time to Placer completion: 54 secs 
Total CPU time to Placer completion: 53 secs 
0 connection(s) routed; 2993 unrouted active, 7 unrouted PWR/GND. 
Starting router resource preassignment
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End of iteration 1
3000 successful; 0 unrouted; (0) REAL time: 1 mins 15 secs
Total REAL time: 1 mins 15 secs
Total CPU time: 1 mins 15 secs
End o f route. 3000 routed (100.00%); 0 unrouted.
No errors found.
Completely routed.
This design was run without timing constraints. It is likely that much better 
circuit performance can be obtained by trying either or both o f the following:
- Enabling the Delay Based Cleanup router pass, if  not already enabled
- Supplying timing constraints in the input design
Total REAL time to Router completion: 1 mins 16 secs 
Total CPU time to Router completion: 1 mins 16 secs 
Generating PAR statistics.
The Delay Summary Report 
The Score for this design is: 169
The Number o f signals not completely routed for this design is: 0 
The Average Connection Delay for this design is: 1.182 ns
The Maximum Pin Delay is: 4.441 ns
The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is: 2.576 ns
Listing Pin Delays by value: (ns)
d < 1.00 < d <2.00 < d < 3.00 < d < 4 . 0 0  < d < 5 . 0 0  d>=5 . 00  
1253 1421 223 93 10 0
Dumping design to file top.ned.
All signals are completely routed.
Total REAL time to PAR completion: 1 mins 24 secs 
Total CPU time to PAR completion: 1 mins 23 secs
Placement: Completed - No errors found.
Routing: Completed - No errors found.
PAR done.
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Appendix D Place and Route Report of FIR Filter with 8-bit Watermark
Release 4.2i - Par E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.
Tue Mar 09 21:38:33 2004 
par -f _par.rsp
Constraints file: top.pcf
Loading design for application par from file partem p.ncd.
"top" is an NCD, version 2.37, device xc2v250, package csl44, speed -6 
Loading device for application par from file '2v250.nph' in environment 
D:/Xilinx.
Device speed data version: ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02.
Device utilization summary:
Number o f External IOBs 78 out o f 92 84%
Number o f LOCed External IOBs 78 out o f 78 100%
Number o f MULTI 8X18s 8 out o f 24 33%
Number of SLICEs 489 out of 1536 31%
Overall effort level (-ol): 5 (set by user)
Placer effort level (-pi): 5 (set by user)
Placer cost table entry (-t): 1 
Router effort level (-rl): 5 (set by user)
Extra effort level (-xe): 0 (set by user)
Starting Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 23 secs 
Finished Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 23 secs 
Automatic resolution o f clock placement was successful.
It was not necessary to constrain the placement o f any o f the logic driven by 
the global clocks with the current clock placement.______________________
## Automatic clock placement completed.
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Starting Optimizing Placer. REAL time: 29 secs
Optimizing
Swapped 0 comps.
Xilinx Placer [1] 301752 REAL time: 30 secs 
Finished Optimizing Placer. REAL time: 30 secs 
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Total REAL time to Placer completion: 31 secs 
Total CPU time to Placer completion: 30 secs
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0 connection(s) routed; 2995 unrouted active, 7 unrouted PWR/GND. 
Starting router resource preassignment 
Completed router resource preassignment. REAL time: 32 secs 
Starting iterative routing.
Routing active signals.
End o f iteration 1
3002 successful; 0 unrouted; (0) REAL time: 52 secs 
Total REAL time: 52 secs 
Total CPU time: 52 secs
End of route. 3002 routed (100.00%); 0 unrouted.
No errors found.
Completely routed.
This design was run without timing constraints. It is likely that much better 
Circuit performance can be obtained by trying either or both of the following:
- Enabling the Delay Based Cleanup router pass, if  not already enabled
- Supplying timing constraints in the input design
Total REAL time to Router completion: 53 secs 
Total CPU time to Router completion: 52 secs 
Generating PAR statistics.
The Delay Summary Report 
The Score for this design is: 167 
The Number o f  signals not completely routed for this design is: 0 
The Average Connection Delay for this design is: 1.179 ns 
The Maximum Pin Delay is: 4.441 ns
The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is: 2.463 ns 
Listing Pin Delays by value; (ns)
d < 1.00 < d <2.00 < d <3.00 < d < 4 . 0 0  < d < 5 . 0 0  d>=5.00
1251 1425 225 91 10 0
Dumping design to file top.ned 
All signals are completely routed.
Total REAL time to PAR completion: 1 mins 
Total CPU time to PAR completion: 59 secs 
Placement: Completed - No errors found.
Routing: Completed - No errors found.
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Appendix E Layout of Comb Filter Before and After Watermarking
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Appendix F Layout of CDMA Match Filter Before and After Watermarking
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Appendix G Layout of DCT Before and After Watermarking
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